Connaissance commune et consensus
Abstracts
In a seminal paper, Aumann [1976] showed that if agents have common knowledge of their posterior probabilities of some event, then these posteriors must be the same, provided that they have the same prior probability. This result has given rise to a vast literature about the implications of common knowledge for consensus. The aim of this paper is first to present how knowledge and common knowledge are modelled in economic analysis. Then we review some extensions of Aumann’s agreement theorem.
Editor's notes
Je tiens à remercier David Encaoua, Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler, Philippe Solal, Jean-Marc Tallon et Nicolas Vieille, ainsi que deux rapporteurs anonymes pour leurs nombreuses remarques sur cet article. Réalisé avec le soutien financier du ministère français de la Recherche (Actions Concertées Incitatives).
References
Bibliographical reference
Lucie Ménager, “Connaissance commune et consensus”, Revue d'économie industrielle, 114-115 | 2006, 41-66.
Electronic reference
Lucie Ménager, “Connaissance commune et consensus”, Revue d'économie industrielle [Online], 114-115 | 2e-3e trimestre 2006, Online since 29 November 2007, connection on 29 March 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rei/336; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.336
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