Fondements épistémiques de concepts d’équilibre en théorie des jeux
Abstracts
A lot of attention has been devoted to give epistemic foundations to usual equilibrium concepts in game theory. An equilibrium concept is said to have an epistemic foundation if one can identify conditions in terms of knowledge and rationality of the players which are sufficient to guarantee that players will play the equilibrium. In this paper, we review the epistemic foundations of three usual equilibrium concepts, namely Nash equilibrium, rationalizable equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. In particular, we insist on the role played by the assumption of common knowledge of the players’rationality.
References
Bibliographical reference
Lucie Ménager and Olivier Tercieux, “Fondements épistémiques de concepts d’équilibre en théorie des jeux”, Revue d'économie industrielle, 114-115 | 2006, 67-84.
Electronic reference
Lucie Ménager and Olivier Tercieux, “Fondements épistémiques de concepts d’équilibre en théorie des jeux”, Revue d'économie industrielle [Online], 114-115 | 2e-3e trimestre 2006, Online since 29 November 2007, connection on 29 March 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rei/328; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.328
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